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Health Care Providers Meet ERISA:





It happens every day. A patient enters a hospital or doctor's office
seeking medical treatment. Before starting treatment, the health care
provider tries to verify that it will be paid. Its first step is to ask the
patient about any insurance coverage he or she may have. Often that
coverage is provided under an employee welfare benefit plan estab-
lished by the patient's employer. The provider usually takes one more
step; it makes a telephone call to confirm that there is indeed coverage.
It may call the patient's employer, the plan administrator, the insurer,
or someone else associated with the plan. Upon assurance that there is
coverage, the provider begins treatment.
When treatment is done, the provider submits a bill, expecting to be
paid. Unfortunately, the assurance of coverage sometimes turns out to
be wrong and the plan refuses to pay the bill. Frequently, the provider's
only recourse to receive payment is to sue the plan or the party that
misrepresented coverage under state law claims such as misrepresenta-
tion or promissory estoppel.'
But is a lawsuit itself a viable option? If the plan is an employee
welfare benefit plan2 under the Employment Retirement Income
* Jeffrey A. Brauch is an attorney with the law firm of Quarles & Brady in
Milwaukee and a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School. The author
would like to thank David R. Cross and Laurene M. Brooks for their helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Although such claims may take various forms, they will be collectively referred
to herein as "provider misrepresentation claims."
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1988) defines an employee welfare benefit plan as
Security Act (ERISA),3 the defendant will argue that a lawsuit is
impermissible. The defendant will insist that ERISA preempts state law
claims and seek their dismissal.
Controversy exists as to whether ERISA should preempt provider
misrepresentation claims. In the last two and a half years, a number of
courts, including three circuit courts of appeal, have struggled with this
controversy. Their answers have varied greatly and there is now a
conflict among the circuits. This Article examines the decisions of these
courts and proposes the proper resolution to the preemption dilemma
in light of federal case law that has defined the scope of ERISA
.preemption. The Article concludes that ERISA should not preempt
provider misrepresentation claims.
II. THE SCOPE OF ERISA PREEMPTION
A. Breadth of Preemption
Congress's express purpose in creating ERISA was
to protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and benefi-
ciaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts.'
To further this purpose, Congress provided that ERISA preempts certain
state laws that "relate to" any employee benefit plan, by stating that
"[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan."' This preemption provision protects beneficiaries
follows:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established
or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to
the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained
for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through
the purchase of insurance or otherwise .... medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits.
ld.
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(19S).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). Other provisions exempt certain laws from the
application of this general preemption provision. For example, 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(A) (1988) exempts some state laws regulating insurance, banking, or secu-
rities. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (1988) exempts generally applicable criminal laws. 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1988) exempts qualified domestic relations orders. None of these
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by preventing duplication of the situation that existed before Congress
enacted ERISA. Before ERISA's enactment, plans and plan sponsors
faced a maze of different and often conflicting state laws and regulations
that resulted in administrative inefficiencies and costs which ultimately
hurt beneficiaries.6 Through the preemption provision, Congress sought
to make the regulation of pension and benefit plans an exclusively feder-
al concern,. which was subject to a single set of federal laws.7
The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the preemption provision."
It has proclaimed that a state "law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan,
in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or refer-
ence to such a plan." The law in question need not be directed at an
employee benefit plan; it may have only an indirect effect on the plan.
0
Nor must the law deal specifically with the subject matters covered by
ERISA, such as reporting requirements or fiduciary duties." ERISA may
preempt a state law, even if that law provides for traditional state causes
of action, such as breach of contract 2 or wrongful discharge."3 The
scope of preemption is so broad that ERISA may preempt even those
laws that are consistent with its purposes."'
provisions, however, affects whether ERISA should preempt provider misrepresents-
tion claims.
6. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 484 (1990).
7. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987); David P. Kallus,
ERISA-Do Health Care Providers Have Standing to Bring A Civil Entforcement
Action Under Section 1132(a)?, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 173, 174-76 (1990).
8. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990) ("The pre-emption clause
is conspicuous for its breadth."); see also Ingersoll-Rand, 111 S. Ct. at 482. Indeed,
one federal court discussing preemption has warned that "[t]he ERISA quicksand is
fast swallowing up everything that steps in it or near it." Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins.
Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
9. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). See also Pilot Life, 481
U.S. at 47.
10. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47-48; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98; see, e.g., Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981) (finding that ERISA preempts a
New Jersey worker's compensation law that prohibits a pension plan from reducing
benefits by amounts received in worker's compensation benefits even though the law
effects an "indirect" regulation of a plan).
11. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98; see also Ingersoll-Rand, 111 S. Ct. at 483 (holding
that ERISA preempts wrongful discharge law); FMC, 111 S. Ct. at 408 (finding that
ERISA preempts anti-subrogation law).
12. See, e.g., Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57.
13. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand, 111 S. Ct. at 483.
14. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829
(1988) (declaring that ERISA preempts a Georgia garnishment statute, even though it
B. The Tenuousness Exception
With such a broad interpretation, it would seem that no state law
could survive preemption because almost any law can affect an ERISA
plan in some sense. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court created one
important exception to the application of ERISA's preemption clause, in
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.: 5 "Some state actions may affect em-
ployee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to
warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan."'
Having created this exception, the Court in Shaw said nothing about
its application. The Court gave no guidance in how to distinguish a "tenu-
ous" effect on a benefit plan from an effect which warrants preemption.
It noted only that, under the facts before it, the law's relationship to the
plan clearly warranted preemption."
Since Shaw, the Supreme Court has left lower federal courts to deter-
mine when a law's effect on an employee benefit plan is too tenuous to
warrant a finding of preemption. The federal courts have generally con-
cluded that if the state law specifically refers, to or is directed at, em-
ployee benefit plans, then the relationship is not too tenuous to warrant
preemption.' If, however, the law is one of general application that hap-
pens to impact an ERISA plan in a particular case, then an issue of tenu-
ousness might arise.
Federal courts consider a variety of factors in determining when a
generally applicable state law relates to an ERISA plan in so tenuous a
manner that it does not warrant preemption. This Article focuses on
was enacted "to help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes").
15. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
16. Id. at 100 n.21.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435, 1448 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that Texas
law exempting retirement benefits from creditors' claims in bankruptcy relates to
ERISA plans because it specifically refers to such plans); McCoy v. Massachusetts
Inst. of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA preempts
Massachusetts mechanics' lien statute that specifically gives rights to trustees of
certain employee benefit plans, thus singling them out for special treatment), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1939 (1992); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. CL 403, 409
(1990); Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829.
19. Several circuit courts of appeal have developed a multifactor analysis to re-
solve such cases. In Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v.
Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034
(1987), the Fifth Circuit determined that two principal factors govern whether a state
law should be preempted: (1) whether it involves a traditional exercise of state
authority, and (2) whether it affects relations among the "principal ERISA enti-
ties-the employer, the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the beneficiaries." ld. at 1467.
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth
Circuit adopted two factors from Sommers and added a third: "The incidental nature
of any possible effect of the state law on an ERISA plan." Id. at 556. In Arkansas
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six of those factors both because federal courts frequently apply them in
preemption cases and because they have particular relevance to the ques-
tion of whether ERISA should preempt provider misrepresentation
claims.
C. Goal of Action
Often, the law at issue creates a state cause of action. In such cases,
the first factor for the. court to consider is the desired goal of a lawsuit
to enforce the cause of action, or the effect of permitting the cause of
action to go forward. If the plan participant brings an action seeking plan
benefits or asserts that the plan improperly processed claims, ERISA will
preempt the action.' ERISA itself provides an exclusive remedy for the
resolution of such disputes.2
Closely related to such claims are participant misrepresentation claims
in which plan participants allege that their employers orally promised
certain benefits which the express terms of an ERISA plan do not pro-
vide. Most courts agree that permitting participants to bring misrepresen-
tation claims would improperly allow an oral modification of a written
ERISA plan.' One such case is Lister v. Stark.' In Lister, a plan par-
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc., 947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2305 (1992), the Eighth Circuit found seven factors that are
relevant to the preemption decision: (1) whether the state law negates an ERISA plan
provision; (2) whether the state law affects relations between primary ERISA entities;
(3) whether the state law impacts the structure of ERISA plans; (4) whether the state
law impacts the administration of ERISA plans; (5) whether the state law has an
economic impact on ERISA plans; (6) whether preemption of the state law is consis-
tent with other ERISA provisions; and (7) whether the state law is an exercise of
traditional state power. ld. at 1344-45.
20. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1987) (holding
that ERISA preempts participant action for reinstatement of employee benefits); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (concluding that ERISA preempts
causes of action alleging insurer bad faith in handling claims); Perkins v. Time Ins.
Co., 898 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that ERISA preempts action by partici-
pant against insurer for tortious breach of contract). The Seventh Circuit finds pre-
emption so obvious in such cases that it has affirmed imposition of Rule 11 sanc-
tions against attorneys who continue to bring such claims. See Maciosek v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United, 930 F.2d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 1991) (imposing Rule 11
sanctions because of frivolous claims); Tomczyck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United,
951 F.2d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that "entire manner in which [this] appeal
has been pursued justifies sanctions"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2274 (1992).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988). See Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 62-63.
22. See, e.g., Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating
ticipant brought an action against his employer, benefit trust, and trust-
ees seeking certain benefits. ' He claimed that his employer convinced
him, a recently terminated employee, to return to work by promising him
that his small gap in employment would not affect the vesting of his
pension benefits.' When the plan terms prevented the vesting his em-
ployer had promised, the participant sued for fraud and breach of an oral
contract to modify the plan.' The court found that the participant want-
ed to enforce an oral modification of the pension plan and to collect
unauthorized plan benefits." The court stated that the proper route to
seek benefits was through ERISA's own enforcement mechanism, 29
U.S.C. § 1132.' Therefore, ERISA would preempt any other claims for
benefits.'
However, federal courts have refused to find that ERISA preempts
certain causes of action that affect a plan as they would any other entity.
The Supreme Court noted in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Ser-
vice, Inc.' that ERISA would not preempt "lawsuits against ERISA plans
for run-of-the-mill state law claims such as unpaid rent, failure to pay
creditors, or even torts committed by an ERISA plan."' As a result, low-
er courts have found that ERISA plans, like any other entity, should be
liable for traditional torts and breaches of contract.' The federal courts
that ERISA preempts a suit by a former employee against a former employer and
-union for breach of an oral contract to provide special early retirement benefits);
Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1297 (5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that *§
1102(a)(1) precludes the creation of a cause of action based on an oral contract
under ERISA"); Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that claimed common law contract right to have a plan modified relates to
the plan such that ERISA preempts relevant state law); see also Richard P. Carr &
Christine L Thierfelder, Talk is Cheap: Oral Misrepresentations as a Basis for Re-
covery from Employee Benefit Plans, 3 BENEFiTS LJ. 199 (1990); Comment, Estoppel
Claims Against ERISA Employee Benefit Plans, 25 U.C. DAvis L REv. 487, 528-32
(1992).
23. 890 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 579 (1990).
24. Id. at 942.
25. Id. at 943. The plaintiff alleged that after working from 1964 to 1970 and
leaving for nine months, the defendant promised him that he would credit the plain-
tiff upon his return for those years. Id.
26. Id, at 948.
27. Id. at 944-45.
28. ld.
29. 1L at 944.
30. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
31. Al at 833.
32. See, e.g., National Health Plan Corp. v. Road Carriers Local 707 Welfare Fund,
13 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2157 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (asserting that ERISA does not
preempt an administrative service provider's breach of contract claim against plan);
Abofreka v. Alston Tobacco Co., 341 S.E.2d 622 (S.C. 1986) (stating that ERISA does
not preempt tort claim against plan).
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have found that plans are subject to state laws which set the rates hospi-
tals may charge.' Federal courts have also treated plans like any other
employer and hold them subject to employment discrimination laws.' In
such cases, the courts find that the state causes of action had too tenu-
ous a relationship to the plan to warrant preemption.
Some federal courts have used this analysis to allow claims closely
related to participant misrepresentation claims. These claims seek relief
for misrepresentations that occurred prior to the formation of an ERISA
plan or were made by someone other than the plan or its fiduciaries. The
courts reason that the plaintiffs goal is not to recover plan benefits, but
rather to seek a traditional remedy apart from the plan for the tort of
misrepresentation.
For example, in Perkins v. Time Insurance Co.,' an ERISA health
plan participant sued both the insurer of the plan and an independent
insurance agent after his medical claim was denied under the plan be-
cause of a pre-existing condition.TM The court held that ERISA preempt-
ed the tortious breach of contract action against the plan insurer because
it was an. improper attempt to recover benefits under the plan.' Con-
versely, the court found that ERISA did not preempt the action against
the independent agent.' The action against the agent alleged that the
agent induced the participant to surrender his existing coverage and to
join the Time plan by representing to the participant that a pre-existing
condition clause would not apply to his medical condition.' The court
found that the participant was not seeking plan benefits from the agent,
but rather damages due to a standard tort that the agent committed prior
to the plan's formation and apart from the terms of the plan.'
33. See, e.g., Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1088 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984).
35. 898 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1990).
36. Id. at 472.
37. Id. at 473.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Other courts confronted with similar facts have reached the-same result.
See, e.g., Perry v. P.LE Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating
that ERISA does not preempt a plan participant's state law fraudulent inducement
claim against former employer when the participant based its action on pre-plan
misconduct and did not seek plan benefits), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); John-
son v. Antioch Univ., 15 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1402, 1406 (D.D.C. 1992)
(concluding that ERISA does not preempt a plan participant's state law fraudulent in-
ducement claim against employer and union); Isaac v. Life Investors Ins. Co., 749
D. Administrative Effect
In deciding whether a law has too tenuous a relationship to an employ-
ee benefit plan, the second major factor courts examine is the effect of
its application on the plan's administration. The Supreme Court has iden-
tified the administrative burden created by differing and conflicting state
laws as a primary reason for the preemption of state laws.'
Any state law, including a general tort or contract law, that applies to
an ERISA plan has some administrative effect. Whether the administra-
tive burden created by the law is sufficient to warrant preemption de-
pends on both the amount of impact on plan administration and where
that impact is felt. Obviously, the greater the impact on plan adminis-
tration, the greater the likelihood that ERISA will preempt the law. In
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,' the Supreme Court noted that a
one-time lump sum payment of benefits does not raise the same kind of
preemption concerns as an "ongoing administrative program" or
"scheme."'
In keeping with this principle, courts have found that ERISA does not
preempt state laws that have only an insignificant impact on an ERISA
plan's administration. For example, in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Borges," the Second Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt
Connecticut's escheat law, even though it required the plan to pay issued
benefits checks to the state if the checks remained unclaimed for three
years.* The court concluded that the administrative effects of the law
on the plan were "indirect" and "not substantial enough" to wanant preemption.'
F. Supp. 855, 863-64 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that ERISA does not preempt state
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation); Greenblatt v. Budd Co., 666 F. Supp. 735, 742
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that ERISA should not preempt misrepresentation cause of
action).
41. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 484 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987). See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
42. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
43. Id. at 11, 12.
44. 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989).
45. Id. at 147.
46. Id. Other cases similarly concluding that an administrative impact is insufficient
to warrant preemption include: Retirement Fund Trust v. Franchise Tax Board, 909
F.2d 1266, 1282 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that ERISA does not preempt California tax
withholding procedures when they have "only a tangential impact on the adininistra-
tion of the plan"); In re Seolas, 140 B.R. 266, 273 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (explaining that
ERISA does not preempt California general usury law when it has only incidentally
affected the plan); Tener v. Hoag, 697 F. Supp. 196, 200 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (concluding
that ERISA does not preempt Pennsylvania statute permitting employees to enforce
agreements with employers to pay wages and fringe benefits when its enforcement
does not subject plan to conflicting requirements or require plan to establish an
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On the other hand, courts have preempted state laws that have a more
significant and direct administrative effect. An example is Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc.'? In Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, the court ruled that ERISA preempted a New Jersey
law that allowed beneficiaries to assign their rights under an ERISA plan
to health care providers. ' The law directly contradicted plan language
that disallowed such assignments unless the plan approved of them.L'
The Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the admin-
istrative effect of the law was minor,n it found that to allow courts to
apply such laws would subject the plan to different obligations in differ-
ent states.6'
In addition to the degree of a law's impact on a plan's administration,
the part of the plan's administration that the law impacts is often key in
determining whether preemption will occur. The Second Circuit stated,
"What triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on ad-
ministrative procedures but rather an effect on the primary administra-
tive functions of benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligi-
bility for a benefit and the amount of that benefit."'
administrative scheme).
47. 947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2305 (1992).
48. ld. at 1348.
49. ld. at 1343..
50. ld. at 1348.
51. Id. Other courts have also preempted state laws imposing significant adminis-
trative burdens on ERISA plans. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. New York State Dep't
of Labor, 891 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that ERISA preempts New York's
prevailing wage law in cases in which it regulates contributions to the plan and the
nature and amount of benefits provided under it), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990);
MacLean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that ERISA
preempts state testamentary transfer law in cases in which its application "would
interfere with the administration of the Plan and violate its terms"); Associated Build-
ers & Contractors v. Baca, 769 F. Supp. 1537, 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating that
ERISA preempts city and county prevailing wage ordinances when the ordinances
require an ongoing administrative scheme to calculate wages and benefits paid to
workers under the ordinances).
In addition to this interstate administrative effect, the court in Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield referred 'to an intrastate administrative effect. Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 947 F.2d at 1346. It noted that even in New Jersey, applying
the assignment law would force plan administrators to monitor which plan benefi-
ciaries had. made assignments and to whom they were made. Id. at 1346-47. This
added administrative burden further convinced the court that the law's relationship to
the plan was close enough to warrant preemption.
52. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493
This principle also helps explain the results in cases like Borges and
Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield. The Borges court refused to find
that ERISA preemped the escheat law in part because the administrative
burden of sending unclaimed checks to the state did not impact primary
functions, such as calculating benefits or determining eligibility.' On the
other hand, in Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the administrative
impact created by the benefit assignment law most directly affected the
payment of benefits.M The law required administrators to determine
whether a third party payor was eligible for benefits under both the
terms of the plan and a valid agreement of assignment.'
E. Economic Impact
Closely related to a state law's administrative impact upon an ERISA
plan is its economic impact. State laws often impose costs on a plan,
either by increasing the administrative tasks of the plan or by requiring it
to make certain payments. As with administrative impact, ERISA does
not preempt a law simply because it has some economic impact on a
plan.' Thus, in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,"
the Supreme Court refused to find that ERISA preempts Georgia's gener-
al garnishment statute even though application of the law would impose
costs on the plan and participants.'
As with administrative impact, the amount of the economic impact is
important. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Borges,' the Second Circuit
conceded that application of Connecticut's escheat law would increase
the cost of providing benefits.' However, it found that this economic
U.S. 811 (1989).
53. Id. at 147. See also Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S.
825, 841 (1988) (declaring that ERISA does not preempt Georgia's general garnish-
ment statute); Retirement Trust Fund v. Franchise Tax Bd., 909 F.2d 1266, 1282 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that ERISA does not preempt California's tax withholding proce-
dures); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that ERISA does
not preempt a law prescribing rates hospitals can charge for in-patient care), cert. de-
nied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
54. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 947 F.2d at 1346.
6. Id. at 1347. The same reasoning is apparent in other preemption decisions. See,
e.g., MacLean, 831 F.2d at 728; Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 327
(2d Cr. 1986) (stating that ERISA preempts state law claims to enforce severance
pay policy when they would determine whether benefits would be paid and "directly
affect the administration of benefits under the plan"); General Elec., 891 F.2d at 29.
56. Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 483 (1990); Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 947 F.2d at 1348.
57. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
58. Id. at 831-32.
59. 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989).
60. Id. at 147.
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impact was indirect and insubstantial.6
In contrast, ERISA has preempted state laws imposing significant costs
on ERISA plans. Illustrative is Texas' Administrative Service Tax Act,'
which imposed a tax on the collection of administrative fees by various
entities, including health benefit plans.' In E-Systems, Inc. v. Pogue,"
the Fifth Circuit found that ERISA preempted a tax, which amounted to
2.5 percent of all claims paid and money disbursed by the plan, because
it had a significant economic impact. ' The net effect of the tax was to
reduce plan assets and the plan's capability to pay benefits.'
When a state law permits a participant to bring a cause of action
against a plan, there is an obvious economic impact because the plan
will pay any judgment. However, this type of economic impact alone
cannot justify preemption of a state law. ERISA itself permits actions to
be brought against employee benefit plans.' Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has recognized that plans can be sued for run-of-the-mill state law
claims, such as the failure to pay rent or commission of a tort.'
Some courts consider it important that a plan does not have to pay a
judgment in concluding that ERISA should not preempt a law or cause of
action. In Johnson v. Antioch University,' the court held that ERISA
did not preempt a fraudulent inducement claim when it did "not require
relief directly from the plan itself but rather from the wrongdoers. ""°
61. Id. See Nunez v. Wyatt Cafeterias, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 165, 169 (N.D. Tex. 1991)
(stating that ERISA does not preempt negligence action when there is, "at most, an
indirect economic impact" between common law rights and plan); Rebaldo v. Cuomo,
749 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that ERISA does not preempt state control
of in-patient hospital rates), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
62. TEx INS. CODE ANN. art 4.11A (West 1993).
63. Id.
64. 929 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 585 (1991).
65. Id. at 1101, 1104.
66. Id. at 1103. See also Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp.
Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1348-49 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that assignment of benefits law's
economic impact on plan supports finding of preemption), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2305 (1992); Birdsong v. Olson, 708 F. Supp. 792, 801 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (finding that
ERISA preempted Texas Administrative Service Tax Act due to substantial economic
Impact on plan).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
68. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988).
69. 15 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1402 (D.D.C. 1992).
70. Id. at 1406. See Pizlo v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 116, 120-21 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that ERISA does not preempt claim when employer, and not plan, Is
liable for damages); Greenblatt v. Budd Co., 666 F. Supp. 735, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
Some courts, however, do not consider whether the plan or a separate
entity pays a judgment to be a factor. In Cefalu v. BF. Goodrich, the
Fifth Circuit held to be "without merit" a contention that ERISA should
not preempt a participant misrepresentation claim because the partici-
pant was seeking to recover benefits from his employer and not from the
plan.
m
F. Role of Plan Document in Resolution of Dispute
Often, a court must look to an ERISA plan document to resolve a dis-
pute under a state law. The degree to which the plan document is used
has been an additional factor in determining whether the relationship
between a plan and a state law is too tenuous to warrant preemption.
The plan document may be used either to establish liability or to calcu-
late damages.
Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon' serves as an example of using a plan
document to establish liability. There, the Supreme Court held that
ERISA preempted a state wrongful discharge claim because, in order to
resolve the dispute, the Court would have had to examine the terms of
an ERISA plan to decide if the employer had a pension-defeating motive
when terminating the participant's employment.4 Similarly, in Van
Camp v. AT&T Information Systems,' the Sixth Circuit found that
ERISA preempted sex and age discrimination claims which would have
required the court to rule on the validity of a retirement agreement.
76
A court is also more likely to find that ERISA preempts a state law
claim when it must refer to the plan in calculating damages. In Cefalu,
the' most important consideration in the court's decision to preempt a
plan participant's misrepresentation claim was that if the participant es-
tablished that his former employer had misrepresented plan benefits, the
court would compute the damages by reference to the plan under which
the participant had worked."
71. 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989).
72. Id. at 1293. See Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 945 n.10 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding
in favor of preemption); Carter v. Amax Coal Corp., 748 F. Supp. 812, 816 (D. Utah
1990) (rejecting argument that ERISA should not preempt claim because participant
will recover damages from corporation, not from benefit plan fund).
73. 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990).
74. Id. at 483. See Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that ERISA preempted widow's wrongful death action when she
claimed that her husband's death resulted directly from improper termination of plan
benefits).
75. 963 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 365 (1992).
76. Id. at 123.
77. Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1294 (5th Cr. 1989). See Christo-
pher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1219 (5th Cr.) (finding that ERISA preempted
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G. Effect of Law on Relations Among Principal ERISA Entities
A fifth important factor that courts consider in determining whether
ERISA preempts a state law is the effect of the law on the relations
among principal ERISA entities. The Fifth Circuit summarized the appli-
cation of this principle as follows:
[T]he courts are more likely to find that a state law relates to a benefit plan if it
affects relations among the principal ERISA entities-the employer, the plan, the
plan fiduciaries, and the beneficiaries--than if it affects relations between one of
these entities and an outside party, or between two outside parties with only an
incidental effect on the plan."
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser," the Sixth Circuit found
the relations among ERISA entities to be one of three key factors in
determining whether a state law's relationship to a plan is too tenuous to
warrant preemption.' Applying this factor, the court found that ERISA
did not preempt an Akron city income tax even though it applied to com-
pensation deferred under an ERISA savings trust benefit plan.8' The
court found that the law did not affect relations among ERISA entities,
but rather affected individuals as employees without regard to their sta-
tus as ERISA participants.' Similarly, in Perkins v. Time Insurance
Co.,' the Fifth Circuit concluded that a participant's allegation of fraud
by a non-fiduciary independent agent did not affect the relations among
the principal ERISA entities.'
various state law claims when the court will measure damages in part by reference
to plan benefits), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 68 (1992); E-Systems, Inc. v. Pogue, 929
F.2d 1100, 1103 (5th Cir.) (finding preemption when the court will calculate the
amount of tax awarded the state by reference to a plan and claims paid under it),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 585 (1991); Birdsong v. Olson, 708 F. Supp. 792, 801 (W.D.
Tex. 1989) (preempting a tax act). But see Pizlo v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 884 F.2d
116, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that ERISA did not preempt state law claims
when, although the court would measure damages in part by plan benefits, claim
would not burden plan administration).
78. Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters.
Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987).
79. 810 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1987).
80. ld. at 556. The other key factors are whether the state law involves an exer-
cise of traditional state authority and the incidental nature of any possible effect of
the state law on the plan. See supra note 19.
81. /restone, 810 F.2d at 556.
82. Id.
83. 898 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1990).
84. Id. at 473. See Johnson v. Antioch Univ., 15 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield
v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc.' found that application of this factor
"strongly supports" the preemption of Arkansas' statute, which allows
participants to assign benefits to health care providers.' It noted that
the statute shifted control over who received payment of plan benefits
from the plan administrator to participants, sufficiently affecting relations
among ERISA entities to warrant preemption."
H. Existence of Remedy
The final factor, which is probably the most controversial, is whether a
claimant will be left without a remedy if a court finds that ERISA pre-
empts state law or cause of action. Some courts consider it relevant to
the preemption decision,M while others do not. Indeed, in Perry v. P.I.E
Nationwide, Inc.,- the Sixth Circuit held that the primary reason that
ERISA should not preempt a participant's fraudulent inducement claim
was because ERISA provided no cause of action to remedy the alleged
wrong, leaving the participant without recourse if the court allowed pre-
emption.'
1402, 1406 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach
of contract affect relations among principal ERISA entities and are preempted, while
claims for misrepresentation, gross negligence, and estoppel do not affect such rela-
tions and are not preempted).
86. 947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2305 (1992).
86. Id. at 1346.
87. Id. See Cairns v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 15 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
1702, 1711 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (declaring that ERISA preempts action for breach of
settlement agreement when it affects relations among principal entities).
88. See Isaac v. Life Investors Ins. Co., 749 F. Supp. 855, 863-64 (E.D. Tenn. 1990)
(relying on lack of an alternative remedy in deciding to permit participant to bring a
state law action for fraudulent inducement); Greenblatt v. Budd Co., 666 F. Supp.
735, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (same).
89. 872 F.2d 157 (6th Cr. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
90. Id. at 162. The issue of alternative remedies impacts the preemption question
in another way. If ERISA provides a remedy for a given claim, ERISA almost certain-
ly preempts any state law remedy for that claim. See Aetna [We Ins. Co. v. Borges,
869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989). Thus, the Supreme
Court in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. CL 478 (1990), held that ERISA
preempted a state wrongful discharge that was based upon the employee's allegation
that his discharge was based upon his employer's desire to avoid making contribu-
tions to his pension fund. Id. at 483. The Court noted that section 510 of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1140 (1988), expressly provides relief in such situations. IngersoU-Rand, 111
S. Ct. at 485. "By Its terms, § 510 protects plan participants from termination motivat-
ed by an employer's desire to prevent a pension from vesting." Id. See also Johnson
v. Antioch Univ., 15 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1402, 1406 (D.D.C. 1992) (an-
nouncing that ERISA preempts state law breach of fiduciary duty claim because 29
U.S.C. § 1132 (1988) specifically provides a remedy for such claims); Lister v. Stark,
890 F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1989) (declaring that ERISA preempts a participant's
510
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The majority rule, however, appears to be that the lack of a remedy is
an invalid consideration in resolving whether ERISA preempts a
participant's state law claim." For example, in Lister v. Stark, 2 the
Seventh Circuit preempted a plan participant's fraudulent inducement
claim even though the ruling meant that the participant would have no
legal recourse for the alleged misrepresentation.' The court conceded
that the decision left the plaintiff without a remedy, but ruled that avail-
ability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for preemption of state
laws."
I. ARE PROVIDER MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS PREEMPTED?
It is against this backdrop that federal courts have addressed the ques-
tion of whether ERISA preempts health care provider misrepresentation
claims. They have answered this question in every way possible: yes, no,
and maybe.
A Yes
Leading the "Yes" group is the Sixth Circuit's decision in CromweU v.
Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp.' Within its three opinions, Cromwell con-
tains a discussion of almost all of the preemption factors previously
identified. Cromwell arose when Brenda Reinke, a Beckman Industries
(Beckman) plan beneficiary, sought home health care from Heterodox
Health Systems (Heterodox), a health care provider. Before agreeing to
provide care, Heterodox called the Beckman plan administrator, Equicor-
Equitable (Equicor) "to verify that the provision of such care to Mrs.
Reinke would be covered by the Beckman plan. Allegedly, Equicor did
verify this.'
Heterodox provided care to Mrs. Reinke for six months. Equicor paid
misrepresentation claim because such a claim is, in essence, a claim for benefits is
recoverable only under section 1132), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 579 (1990).
91. See, e.g., Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989); Anderson
v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cr. 1987); see also, Cefalu v. B.F.
Goodrich, 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989).
92. 890 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 579 (1990).
93. Id. at 944..See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Lister.
94. Lister, 890 F.2d at 946.
95. 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2 (1992).
96. Id. at 1275.
Heterodox for its services for the first three and a half months. Equicor
then learned that Reinke was not actually covered under the Beckman
plan and, therefore, was not entitled to benefits.' Equicor stopped pay-
ing claims, although it did not notify Heterodox until nearly two and a
half months later that it would no longer reimburse Heterodox for its
services. At that point, Heterodox had unpaid invoices totaling
$22,700.08.9
When Equicor failed to pay this amount, Heterodox filed suit in state
court alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligence, and
breach of the duty of good faith.' Equicor removed the case to federal
court and then moved for and received summary judgment on the ground
that ERISA preempted the claims."
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state law
claims.' It specifically rejected Heterodox's argument that those claims
arose under general state laws having only a, tenuous or peripheral effect
on an ERISA plan." The court's rejection was based upon two princi-
pal arguments. First, the court emphasized the breadth of ERISA's pre-
emption clause." In this portion of the decision, the court specifically
refused to concern itself with whether the plaintiff had an alternative
remedy if ERISA preempted the statutory claims, concluding that this
was not a valid factor for consideration."' The court insisted that it is
not relevant "to an analysis of the scope of federal preemption that ap-
pellants may be left without a remedy.""
The Cromwell court found that the most important factor was the goal
of the action. The court declared that the state law claims were simply
claims seeking the recovery of an ERISA plan benefit."' Although it did
not cite them, the court employed the same reasoning that courts have
used in participant misrepresentation cases such as Lister v. Stark"7
and Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co.: a misrepresentation claim is simply
an attempt to modify the terms of a plan and recover benefits that the
plan fails to provide. Cromwell also briefly addressed the principal







103. Id. at 1275-76.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1276.
106. Id.
107. 890 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 579 (1990).
108. 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989).
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at the very heart of issues within the scope of ERISA's exclusive regula-
tion and, if allowed, would affect the relationship between plan princi-
pals by extending coverage beyond the' terms of the plan. Clearly,
appellant's claims are preempted by ERISA. " "I
In his concurring opinion, Judge Suhrheinrich outlined additional rea-
sons why the plaintiff's claims should be preempted. He considered the
economic and administrative, impact of the causes of action on the plan
and found that the impact would be negative in three ways. First, the
plan would pay any judgment, leaving fewer funds available to pay
claims of beneficiaries. "0 Second, the payment of a damage award
would require actuarial adjustments "since such a judgment will not have
been a factor in the plan's projections.""' Third, the plan would be sub-
ject to varying laws of different states concerning the types of damages
recoverable in tort."' Judge Suhrheinrich also noted that failing to pre-
empt the claim would allow parties to accomplish through tort law that
which they could not accomplish through contract law."'
Judge Jones dissented, decrying what he considered to be the
majority's "boiler-plate unreflective approach to ERISA preemption."""
He noted that the result of such an approach "is to frequently leave de-
serving claimants without recourse in state or federal court.""' Judge
Jones relied heavily on Memorial Hospital System v. Northbrook Life
Insurance Co.," 6 in which the Fifth Circuit determined that ERISA did
not preempt a provider's misrepresentation claim."' He agreed with the
Fifth Circuit's finding that provider misrepresentation actions do not
involve a claim for coverage under the plan; rather, they involve a claim
brought for damages because there is no coverage under the plan."8
Judge Jones also agreed that such claims do not affect the relations
among principal ERISA entities. Instead, they are actions between a non-
ERISA entity and the plan."' Finally, Judge Jones discussed the purpose
109. CromweU, 944 F.2d at 1276.
110. Id. at 1279 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring).
111. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring).
112. 1d. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring).
113. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring).
114. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
116. 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990). For a detailed discussion of Memorial Hospital,
see infra text accompanying notes 139-72.
117. Memorial Hosp., 904 F.2d at 250.
118. Cromwell, 944 F.2d at 1284 (Jones, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
of ERISA and concluded that the law was meant to enhance coverage for
employees, not to- immunize plans and administrators from state law
claims tenuously related to the plan."
Another major case finding that ERISA preempts a provider misrepre-
sentation claim is Beaumont Neurological Hospital v. Humana, Inc.'
In Beaumont, the hospital alleged that Humana "verified health insurance
coverage at the time when three patients were admitted" for substance
abuse treatment." Humana later denied coverage, insisting that the
treatment was not medically necessary under the terms of Humana's
group health plan." The hospital sued Humana in Texas state court,
alleging that Humana negligently verified coverage and breached a con-
tract."H The hospital sued as an assignee of the patient's rights under
the Humana plan.' Humana removed the case to federal court and
then moved for and received summary judgment on the ground that
ERISA preempted the state law claims."
The analysis in Beaumont was essentially the same as that used in
120. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
121. 780 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D. Tex. 1991).
122. Ld. at 1135.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Assignment of benefits agreements between participants and providers can
have the effect of permitting a provider to sue under ERISA itself. See, e.g., Psychi-
atric Inst., Inc. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 24, 30 (D.D.C. 1992)
(finding that a health care provider has derivative standing to sue as an assignee of
an ERISA plan participant or beneficiary); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Bene-
fits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that ERISA contained no ex-
press language forbidding such assignments); Kallus, supra note 7, at 220.
However, plans may prohibit the use of such clauses by placing anti-assignment
provisions in the plan document. Courts have have held that such anti-assignment
provisions are enforceable. See, e.g., Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's
Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1351 (8th Cir. 1991) (declaring that state "assignment
statute 'relates to' ERISA plans"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2305 (1992); Davidowitz v.
Delta Dental Plan, Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1481 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "ERISA
welfare plan payments are not assignable in the face of an express non-assignment
clause in the plan").
Further, some courts have held that health care providers have no standing to
sue even if there has been an assignment. See, e.g., Health Scan, Ltd. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (asserting that Congress has enacted
no provision to include the standing to sue by assignees); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 695 F. Supp. 181, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (reiterating
that only participants and beneficiaries have legal right to sue).
In Beaumont, even though the provider relied on the assignment, the court
treated the claims as state law claims rather than claims under ERISA, noting that
the complaint was "devoid of any reference to ERISA." Beaumont, 780 F. Supp. at
1135 n.l.
126. Beaumont, 780 F. Supp. at 1137.
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Cromwell. The Beaumont court began by reviewing Supreme Court pre-
emption decisions and emphasizing the breadth of the preemption doc-
trine.'" Like the Sixth Circuit in Cromwell, the Beaumont court focused
primarily on the goal of the hospital's action. It found that the hospital
brought the action to recover plan benefits promised in an oral modi-
fication of the plan.' Upon making this finding, the court simply con-
cluded that there was "no question that [the hospital's] state law claims
relate to an employee benefit plan under ERISA and are preempted pur-
suant to § 514(a) of the same act." "
A related case is Alexian Brothers Medical Center v. Will County Lo-
cal 174 Carpenters Welfare Fund.' In that case, Alexian Brothers, the
plaintiff health care provider, claimed that it had contacted the defen-
dants, a welfare fund and a health fund, prior to providing medical ser-
vices for Theodore Irmick; the defendants allegedly confirmed that
Irmick was entitled to benefits." Relying on this confirmation, Alexian
Brothers provided treatment." When the defendants later denied cover-
age, Alexian Brothers brought several state law claims against them,
including negligent misrepresentation and equitable estoppel." The de-
fendants removed the case to federal court and then brought a motion to
dismiss on the ground that ERISA preempted the misrepresentation and
estoppel claims.'
The district court agreed." It dismissed the claims on two grounds.
First, it concluded that permitting the claims to proceed could have a
significant economic impact on the plan-if benefits were to be paid out,
127. Id. at 1136-37. It also referred to two Fifth Circuit decisions to further empha-
size the 'broad sweep" of the preemption clause. Id. at 1137. One of those decisions
was Memorial Hospital System v. Northbrook Life Insurance, 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.
1990), a leading case against preemption of provider claims. Interestingly, the court
Ignored Memorial Hospital and referred to a statement in the case that ERISA pre-
empts state law claims "that have the effect of orally modifying the express terms of
an ERISA plan and Increasing plan benefits for participants or beneficiaries who
claim to have been misled." Beaumont, 780 F. Supp. at 1137.
128. Beaumont, 780 F. Supp. at 1137.
129. Id.
130. No. 91-C3777, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1178 (N.D. III. Feb. 5, 1992).




135. Id. at *1.
136. Id. at *6.
the actuarial soundness of the plan might be harmed.' Second, it con-
cluded that the medical center's ultimate goal in the estoppel action was
to orally modify the plan and receive benefits that were not recoverable
under the plan as written."
B. No
Just as a number of courts emphatically answer "Yes" when asked if
ERISA preempts provider misrepresentation claims, others answer with
an equally emphatic "no." The leading case in the "No" group is the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Memorial Hospital System v. Northbrook Life Insur-
ance Co.' The case also contains the most comprehensive analysis of
the preemption question. In Memorial Hospital, defendant Noff's, Inc.
(Noff's) sponsored an employee health plan insured and administered by
Northbrook Life Insurance."a Before providing treatment to Gloria
Echols, the spouse of a Noffs employee, Memorial Hospital (Memorial)
called Noffs to verify coverage under the health plan.'"' According to
the complaint, a Noff's employee "verified that coverage was in effect
137. d at *5.
138. Id. at *6. The precedentlal value of Alexian Brothers for the preemption of
provider misrepresentation claims is unclear. The court did not state whether the
estoppel claim was a state law claim or an estoppel claim under ERISA. Several
factors indicate it was probably the latter. First, the court noted that Alexian Broth-
ers was not suing as a non-ERISA entity, but rather as an assignee of Theodore
Irmick's claim. Id. at *1. Second, the court intended its decision to reject Alexian
Brothers' claim that the Seventh Circuit permitted "estoppel claims to go forward in
the ERISA context." Id. at *4. It appears that Alexian Brothers may have considered
its claim one for estoppel under ERISA's common law. Indeed, the case most dis-
cussed and analyzed in the decision was Black v. TIC Investment Corp., 900 F.2d 112
(7th Cir. 1990), a case in which the Seventh Circuit permitted an equitable estoppel
claim to be brought under ERISA.
An additional decision is somewhat related to the others in the "Yes" category.
In Optimal Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 791 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Tex.
1992), the court found that ERISA preempted a health care providers state law
claims for breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
breach of Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. at 164. The provider sued Travel-
ers, the insurer for a group health plan, as an assignee from the plan participant. Id.
The court granted the insurer summary judgment on the ground that the claims were
simply state law actions to enforce rights under a plan and were thus preempted. Id.
Optimal Health Care is of limited value for purposes of the analysis in this
Article. First, as in Alexian Brothers, the provider sued as an assignee of a principal
ERISA entity, not as a third party with no rights under ERISA. Id. More importantly,
nothing in the reported decision indicates that the insurer had misrepresented the
coverage.
139. 904 F.2d 236 (6th Cr. 1990).
140. d. at 238.
141. Id.
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and available for Echols' hospital care.""' Relying on this assurance of
coverage, Memorial provided services costing approximately $111,000."s
When Memorial requested payment, Northbrook denied coverage.' "
Memorial then sued both Northbrook and Noff's in state court alleging
breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, equitable estoppel, and a
violation of Texas' Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (statuto-
ry misrepresentation). Memorial brought the breach of contract claim for
benefits under the plan based upon an assignment of benefits executed
by Gloria Echols." Memorial brought the remaining claims without re-
gard to the assignment." The lawsuit was removed to the District
Court for the Southern District of Texas. The court dismissed the breach
of contract and statutory claims on the ground that ERISA preempted
them and remanded the estoppel and misrepresentation claims to state
court."
Memorial appealed the dismissal of the breach of contract and statuto-
ry misrepresentation claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
the breach of contract claim, but vacated the dismissal of the statutory
misrepresentation claim." The court found that the breach of contract
claim was merely one for benefits under an ERISA plan." However, it
concluded that the statutory misrepresentation claim was not one for
benefits under the plan; rather, it was a claim by the hospital for damag-
es resulting from the misrepresentation.''
The court began its analysis of the statutory misrepresentation claim
by reviewing the principles governing preemption. It noted that, while
the scope of preemption is broad, it is not limitless, and some state ac-
tions may affect plans in too tenuous a manner to warrant preemp-




145. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (West 1993).
146. Memorial Hosp., 904 F.2d at 238.
147. Id. at 239.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 250.
150. ld. at 243, 250.
151., d. at 244, 250.
152. 1d at 244-45. The court also summarized the types of cases which ERISA
preempts: participant claims alleging improper processing of claims or participant
misrepresentation claims "that have the effect of orally modifying the express terms
of an ERISA plan and increasing plan benefits for participants or beneficiaries who
"two unifying characteristics." " It used these characteristics to create a
two-part test to determine whether ERISA preempts a. state law."
Those characteristics are as follows:(1) the state law claims address ar-
eas of exclusive federal concern, such as the right to receive benefits
under the terms of an ERISA plan; and (2) the claims directly affect the
relationship among the traditional ERISA entities-the employer, the plan
and its fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries. "
Applying the first part of its test, the court determined that the statuto-
ry misrepresentation cause of action did not implicate the federal con-
cerns underlying ERISA.' Instead, that cause of action was predicated
on the "classically important state interest" in allocating risks and ap-
portioning damages between commercial entities operating within a
state."7 The court focused on what it called the "commercial realities"
of the situation: a health care provider was simply seeking to have anoth-
er commercial entity (the plan) accept the consequences of making a
false representation of coverage upon which the provider relied." The
court considered the goal of the action and insisted that the statutory
misrepresentation claim was not one for benefits under the plan and
would in no way expand the parties' rights under the plan."M Instead,
the claim sought damages for a tort committed by the plan. The court
concluded that "[a] provider's state law action under these circumstances
would not arise due to the patient's coverage under an ERISA plan, but
precisely because there is no ERISA plan coverage.""®
The court then addressed two arguments made by the defendants in
their attempt to show that the misrepresentation claim did relate to an
ERISA plan. First, the defendants argued that they were fiduciaries and
thus subject to the fiduciary duties of ERISA.8 ' The court rejected this
argument on the basis that none of the defendants' fiduciary duties ran
to third parties, such as Memorial." Second, the defendants argued
that the plan would play a significant role in the case." They insisted
.that the claim related to an ERISA plan because the court would mea-
sure Memorial's damages, if any, by the amount of benefits provided to




156. ld. at 247.




161. Id. at 247.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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covered individuals under the terms of the plan."M The court conceded
that this was a close question but was unpersuaded.'" It found signifi-
cant that while they might be measured by plan benefits, the damages
did not consist of actual benefits."
In completing its analysis of congressional intent, the court concluded
that to preempt the cause of action would actually frustrate Congress'
intent behind ERISA: to protect the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries." It noted that if providers were unable to bring claims
like this, they would be less likely to provide medical services freely and
might require payment by beneficiaries before offering treatment."'
The court; concluded its opinion by applying the second prong of its
two-part test: whether the claim affects the relationships among principal
ERISA entities." It noted that this was the most important factor in
determining whether a law has too tenuous a relationship to a plan to
warrant preemption.' Applying this factor, the court found that Memo-
rial was neither a principal ERISA entity nor a party to the bargain that
Congress had created in enacting ERISA-a bargain under which plan
participants and beneficiaries received certain protections in exchange
for foregoing certain potential remedies.' Instead, Memorial was sim-
ply an ERISA outsider trying to recover money lost as a result of a com-
mercial entity's misrepresentation.' n
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled against the preemption
of provider claims in Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health
Insurance, Inc.," a case decided just one day before Cromwell. In
Hospice, the plaintiff health care provider rendered four months of post-
164. Id,
165. Id.
166. Id. The court addressed the administrative burden factor at this point of the
opinion as well and concluded that a one-time damage payment would not affect the
ongoing administration of the plan as would, for example, an action seeking addi-
tional pension benefits. Id.
167. Id.
168. ld.
169. Id. at 248. It noted that two types of actions can be brought against ERISA
plans: (1) actions under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 brought by ERISA entities and (2) run-of-
the-mill state law claims (such as torts) brought by non-ERISA entities. Memorial
Hasp., 904 F.2d at 248. While the latter cases have some relationship to a plan, the
court insisted that they did not raise preemptive concerns.- Id.
170. Memorial Hasp., 904 F.2d at 249.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 250.
173. 944 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
surgery medical treatment to an infant." It alleged that it had contact-
ed Blue Cross, the insurer for the ERISA plan covering the infant, about
insurance coverage before admitting the infant. According to the com-
plaint, Blue Cross informed Hospice that "coverage was available.""
Further, Blue Cross "repeatedly assured [the health care provider] that
the care was covered" during the course of the treatment." Following
the infant's discharge, Blue Cross refused to pay for the care, claiming
that the infant was not covered because of the policy's preexisting con-
dition exclusion."
Hospice sued Blue Cross in state court, alleging promissory estoppel,
quantum meruit, and claims as a third-party beneficiary.m Blue Cross
removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss. The trial
court dismissed all claims.'m On appeal, the focus was on whether
ERISA preempted the promissory estoppel claim, thus justifying the
dismissal of the claims.
The Tenth Circuit answered that question "No."" ° Like the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Memorial Hospital, it found that the claim was too tenuously
related to an ERISA plan to warrant preemption.' To support its find-
ing, the court first identified the goal of the action. It concluded that the
action did not seek plan benefits or a modification of the terms of the
plan.18
The court agreed with Memorial Hospital that provider suits do not
arise due to coverage under a plan, but rather because there is no cover-
age.' It also agreed that the "commercial realities" of the situation are
such that if health care providers are left without a remedy, they will be
reluctant to provide care without prepayment.'" The court recognized
that according to the majority rule, the lack of alternative remedies is
irrelevant for purposes of preemption of a participant's claim; however, it
concluded that the lack of alternative remedies should matter for a non-
ERISA entity like Hospice. M
In concluding, the court addressed two additional issues. First, it con-
sidered the economic and administrative impact of its decision on the






180. Id. at 756.
181. Id. at 754.
182. I&
183. Id, at 756.
184. Id
185. Id.
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operation of the plan." Earlier, the court had noted that permitting the
cause of action to proceed would not subject the plan to inconsistent or
conflicting state and local regulations.' Here, the court concluded that
the result would merely force the plan to make a one-time, lump-sum
payment the court would measure according to benefits provided by the
plan, an effect it considered "not consequential enough to connect the
action with[,] or relate the action to, the plan."' Second, the court con-
sidered ERISA's purpose and concluded that it would not be furthered by
preempting misrepresentation claims of a third party provider who is not
one of ERISA's principal entities."
Two district courts reached the same conclusion regarding preemption
of provider claims as the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. One was the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in Horsham Clinic, Inc. v. Principal Mutual
Life Insurance Co." The action was based on an alleged misrepresen-
tation of coverage made by an insurer for an ERISA plan, Principal Mutu-
al Life Insurance Co. (Principal Mutual) to a health care provider, the
Horsham Clinic (Horsham).
Horsham brought the claim in state court. Principal Mutual removed
the case to federal court, claiming that ERISA preempted it. On
Horsham's motion to remand, the court disagreed on two grounds,"'
which this Article discussed in greater depth above. First, it concluded
that Horsham's action was not one for benefits under the terms of the
plan; rather, it was a claim for damages resulting from misrepresenta-
tions made apart from the plan.'" Second, it found that it would not
advance ERISA's purpose by preempting the claim."
The District Court for the Southern District of New York reached the
same result in National Expert Care Consultants, Inc. v. United Air
Lines, Inc.'" It, too, remanded to state court a health care provider's
misrepresentation claim on the ground that the claim's relationship to an
ERISA plan was too tenuous to warrant preemption.' Like the courts
186. Id.
187. Id. at 754.
188. Id. at 755.
189. Id, at 758.
190. No. 92-1003, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8284 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1992).
191. Id. at *10.
192. Id. at *6.
193. Id. at *6-7.
194. No. 90 Civ. 5390 (JFK), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2050 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1991).
195. Id. at *2055-56.
of appeal in Memorial Hospital and Hospice,'" the National Expert
Care court relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff, National Expert
Care Consultants, Inc. (National), was not a principal ERISA entity seek-,
ing to recover benefits. It had no fiduciary relationship with the defen-
dant, United Air Lines (United), and had no entitlement to benefits.'"
The court also found that any recovery would not affect the plan. In fact,
the court concluded that the plan would play a minimal role in the case.
Rather than interpret the plan, the court would focus its inquiry on the
communications between the parties.'"
In addition to these factors, this court employed one factor not consid-
ered in the other cases above. It found significant that the plaintiff sued
United as a corporation, not as an employer or a plan agent.'" The ac-
tion was premised on a corporation committing the tort of misrepresen-
tation, rather than on a plan fiduciary improperly administering the plan.'s
196. See supra notes 139-89 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
Memorial Hospital and Hospice.
197. National Expert Care, No. 90 Civ. 5390 (JFK), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 2055.
198. Id. at *2057.
199. Id. at *2054.
200. Id. This factor also played a role in a related district court decision to remand
to a state court a claim arising out of a misrepresentation made to a provider. In
AMS Properties, Inc. v. Fortis Corporation, No. 92-C-385 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 3, 1992), the
complaint alleged that an employer, Charles Industries, and its agent, Fortis, contact-
ed the plaintiff provider and asked it to treat a Charles Industries employee. Before
rendering care, the provider raised the issue of payment and the parties executed a
written agreement whereupon Charles Industries would reimburse the provider $630.00
per day for 120 days. The agreement did not refer to an ERISA plan or coverage
under it. When the provider tried to collect its treatment costs, Charles Industries re-
fused to pay, claiming that the treatment was not covered under the terms of its
employee benefit plan.
The provider sued Charles Industries and Fortis in state court for breach of
contract and promissory estoppel. The defendants removed the case to federal court
and moved for a dismissal of the claims. The provider opposed the dismissal and
moved the court to remand the case. In a joint decision remanding the case to state
court and denying the motion to dismiss, the court found that ERISA did not pre-
empt the claims. Id,, slip op. at 5. Unlike the cases above, the main focus of the
court's analysis was that the record did not reveal the existence of any plan. Id., slip
op. at 3. Because there was no plan, ERISA was not implicated. Id., slip op. at 4.
The court then concluded that, even allowing for the "conjecture" that Charles
Industries agreed to make payments because of the existence of some plan, ERISA
would still not preempt the claims. Id. It did so on two grounds. First, the court
concurred with the court in National Expert Care and found that AMS was merely
suing Charles Industries as a corporation; it was not attempting to recover from any
plan. Id. "Charles Industries' stockholders, not participants in any ERISA plan the
company may have, are the ones who will be adversely affected by a judgment in
this case." Id. Second, the court found that the identity of the party bringing the
claim-a third-party health care provider-was significant. Id. Citing Hospice and
Memorial Hospital, the court simply stated that '[u]nder circumstances like this,
[Vol. 20: 497, 1993] ERISA Preemption of Provider Claims
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
C. Maybe
Two district courts have tried to create a middle ground on the pre-
emption question." They draw a distinction between misrepresenta-
tions regarding the existence of coverage and misrepresentations regard-
ing a plan's specific benefits. According to these courts, ERISA preempts
state law claims alleging the latter, while it does not preempt those al-
leging the former.
The District Court for the Western District of Missouri was the first to
make this distinction in Coonce v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.' In
Coonce, Tina Coonce, a beneficiary of an ERISA plan, received both in-
patient and out-patient psychiatric treatment. In May 1989, Tina Coonce's
parents sought to transfer her to the San Marcos Treatment Center (San
Marcos). In June and July of 1989, the trustees of the plan amended the
plan to reduce the psychiatric benefits payable. Between May and July
1989, San Marcos had a series of conversations with the plan trustees
and plan insurer, Aetna Life Insurance Co. (Aetna), regarding whether
these benefit reductions would apply to Tina Coonce. Based upon
Aetna's oral representations that Tina Coonce's coverage would remain
intact, San Marcos admitted her as a patient and treated her for more
than a year. Aetna later refused to pay for treatments beyond those pro-
vided in an initial two-week stay.'
When Tina Coonce's parents sued Aetna and the plan trustees, San
Marcos intervened. San Marcos brought, among other claims,' state
law claims for negligent misrepresentation and a violation of Texas' De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act' (statutory misrepresentation). Both sides
filed motions for summary judgment on these claims. Finding that ERISA
preempted the claims, the court granted summary judgment to the defen-
dants.m
The court concluded that the goal of the lawsuit was merely to enforce
there is no preemption." Id., slip op. at 4-5.
201. Parkside Lutheran Hosp. v. R.J. Zeltner & Assocs., Inc. ERISA Plan, 788 F.
Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Coonce v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 759 (W.D.
Mo. 1991).
202. 777 F. Supp. 759.
203. Id. at 762-63.
204. Some of the claims were predicated upon an assignment of benefits. Id. at
772.
205. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (West 1993).
206. Coonce, 777 F. Supp. at 768.
an oral modification of the terms of the plan.' It found the case no dif-
ferent from Anderson v. John MorreU & Co.," in which a participant
brought a breach of contract claim to enforce an oral promise regarding
benefits.
The court then distinguished Memorial Hospital System v. Northbrook
Life Insurance Co.' It noted that in Memorial Hospital the health care
provider simply verified that a prospective patient had coverage, whereas
in the present case, the parties engaged in a series of discussions "for the
express purpose of determining whether Tina would continue to receive
benefits based on pre-July 1989 limits."
210
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois expanded on the
Coonce distinction in Parkside Lutheran Hospital v. R.J. Zeltner & Asso-
ciates, Inc. ERISA Plan. "' In Parkside, an ERISA plan beneficiary, Lin-
da Zeltner, received medical treatment at Parkside Lutheran Hospital
(Parkside). The complaint alleged that an employee of Parkside contact-
ed the defendant ERISA plan and "confirmed that Linda Zeltner had
health benefit coverage under that plan.""2 The plan paid a portion of
the bill, but refused to pay the rest.
Parkside then sued in state court under several theories. First, it
brought an action under ERISA based upon an agreement wherein Linda
Zeltner had assigned her plan benefits to Parkside."' Second, it brought
state law actions for equitable estoppel and negligent misrepresentation
based upon the incorrect verification of coverage." ' After removing the
case to federal court, the defendant moved to dismiss all claims."" The
court dismissed the ERISA claim on the ground that the plan terms pro-
hibited the assignment of benefits."6 The court also dismissed the state
law claims, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to
provide more detail about the alleged misrepresentation underlying the
claims.21 7
When addressing the estoppel and misrepresentation claims, the court
cited Memorial Hospital,"8 Hospice,"' and Judge Jones' dissent in
207. ld.
208. Id. at 767 (citing Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 877 (8th Cir.
1987) (holding that participant breach of contract claim was preempted)).
209. 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 139-72 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Memorial Hospital.
210. Coonce, 777F. Supp. at 768.
211. 788 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. 111. 1992).
212. Id at 1003.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1004.
216. Id. at 1005.
217. Id. at 1007.
218. See supra notes 139-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of Memorial
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Cromwell'm with favor, agreeing that provider claims based upon mis-
representations of coverage often do not relate to an ERISA plan and
should not be preempted." It concluded that preemption would not
occur when misrepresentations create duties that exist outside of an
ERISA plan and do not interfere with duties within the plan.'m Howev-
er, citing Coonce, the court also found that when representations to a
provider modify the terms of a plan, ERISA would preempt a claim based
upon those representations.' The court found that the preemption de-
cision turned on the nature of the misrepresentations:
if it was merely involving a verification of coverage and, quite apart from the
policy itself, created a duty between insurer and provider, the plan is not involved
and the action does not "relate to" the plan; however, if the conversations con-
cerned the nature of the coverage under the plan--e.g., whether an illness was a
pre-existing condition or whether a given procedure was covered under the poli-
cy-they do "relate to" the plan for ERISA pre-emption purposes.'
Having created the distinction, the court dismissed the claims with leave
to amend because the complaint was not clear as to the nature of the
misrepresentations.'
IV. SHOULD ERISA PREEMPT PROVIDER CLAIMS?
Federal courts have answered the preemption question in every way
possible, leaving observers -with a final question: which answer is cor-
rect? This Article concludes that ERISA should not preempt provider
misrepresentation claims. It also concludes that courts cannot maintain
the distinction between misrepresentations of coverage and misrepresen-
tations of benefits available (the CoonceParkside distinction), despite
the distinction's "emotional appeal."'
The Coonce/Parkside distinction has an emotional appeal because the
relationship between the state law claim and the plan seems stronger
when misrepresentations concern specific plan terms. The distinction
Hospital.
219. See supru notes 173-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hospice.
220. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of CromweUl.
221. Par*side, 788 F. Supp. at 1005-06.
222. Id at 1006.
223. Id.
224. Ld. at 1007.
225. Id.
226. Victoria F. Davis, Duking It Out With The Doctors: Litigation Between Provid-
ers and Payers, 5 BENEFrrs LJ. 175, 183 (1992).
also has appeal because of cases such as Coonce.' Unlike Memorial
Hospital or Hospice, Coonce involved a series of conversations between
the plan and a provider regarding whether specific plan changes would
apply to an individual.' The plan and its terms played a large role in
the representations and in the court's decision.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the distinction cannot survive. There is
no real difference between a representation that there is coverage for a
person and a representation that coverage exists for a specific type of
treatment. In both instances, plan terms are equally involved. The terms
of a plan determine who is covered just as they determine what is cov-
ered.'s Further, contrary to the conclusion in Parkside,' the goal of
the lawsuit is not different depending upon the nature of the misrepre-
sentation. It is not true that a misrepresentation about coverage creates
an independent duty resulting in standard tort damages, whereas a mis-
representation about specific plan terms results in an oral modification
of the plan. In both circumstances, a third-party provider seeks damages
caused by the misrepresentation, not coverage under the plan. In both
circumstances, although damages resemble benefits, they are tort damag-
es that are independent of the plan's obligations.
Finally, the Coonce/Parkside distinction may often be unworkable. It is
not always clear when a representation relates solely to whether an indi-
vidual is covered and when it relates to whether coverage is provided for
the individual for a specific treatment. The issues are often interrelated.
The real question, then, is whether ERISA should preempt health care
provider claims based upon misrepresentations about coverage (whether
an individual or of a treatment). It is not an easy question because there
is no doubt that misrepresentation claims bear some relationship to an
employee benefit plan. The answer to the question turns on whether that
relationship is close enough to warrant preemption.
Several of the factors discussed tend to support the view that the rela-
tionship is close enough to warrant preemption. First, the plan usually
plays a role in a court's resolution of a misrepresentation claim. While
the plan is not necessary to determine liability, it is often necessary to
calculate damages. Damages may equal the amount to which a plan par-
ticipant would be entitled under the terms of the plan if there were coverage.131
For that reason, a second factor comes into play. One can fairly argue
227. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of Coonce.
228. Coonce v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 757, 762-63 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
229. Davis, supra note 226, at 183.
230. See supra notes 211-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of Parkside.
231. The court in Memorial Hospital recognized that this factor was a difficult one
in its finding of non-preemption. Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904
F.2d 236, 247 (5th Cir. 1990).
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that the goal of a lawsuit that seeks such damages is to orally modify the
plan: to obtain benefits that the plan expressly prohibits. In this way, the
cases are similar to those such as Lister v. Stark' and Cefalu v. B.F.
Goodrich Co.,f in which courts have refused to permit plan partici-
pants to bring misrepresentation actions to avoid permitting oral modifi-
cation of the plan. Regardless of what they are called, the damages a
plan must pay closely resemble plan benefits in a successful misrepre-
sentation claim, even when a third-party provider sues.'
Additionally, while the administrative impact of the state law claims is
not great,'m that impact is felt in the area of one of ERISA's core con-.
cerns: the payment of benefits under a plan. Thus, under the analysis of
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Borges,' preemption is more likely.
While these factors support a finding of preemption, they are out-
weighed by the remaining factors. First, the administrative and economic
impact of such claims on the plan is not great. Administratively, they do
not subject plans to differing state laws.' Laws that prohibit misrepre-
sentation and provide causes of action to enforce them are standard.
There is no need to vary the terms or operation of a benefit plan from
state to state. In all states, the plan must make truthful representations
to outsiders, just as it must obey anti-discrimination laws when it deals
with its employees.'m
232. 890 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 579 (1990).
233. 871 F.2d 1290 (Sth Cir. 1989).
234. Note that these factors do not exist in all provider cases. For example, in AMS
Properties, Inc. v. Fortis Corp., No. 92-C-385 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 3, 1992), an ERISA plan
was not involved at all. In AMS Properties, the plaintiff was seeking to recover a
fixed amount of money that the defendant had agreed to pay in writing. The action
was only concerned with the interpretation of this agreement and any damages could
be calculated and paid wholly apart from the terns of an ERISA plan. For a discus-
sion of AMS Properties, see supra note 200.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 237-40.
236. 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989). See supra text accom-
panying notes 44-55.
237. This was one of the main reasons for the creation of ERISA. See supr text accompany-
ing notes 6-7. In his CromweU concurrence, Judge Suhrheinrich argues that such
claims do subject plans to varying state laws because each state has different laws
regarding damages for misrepresentation or estoppel. Cromwell v. Equitor-Equtable
HCA Corp., 977 F.2d 1272, 1279 (6th Cir. 1991) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 113 S. CL 2 (1992). But such laws do not affect the administration of the
plan, which was Congress's concern with the effect of varying state laws. See
Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 111 S. CL 478, 484 (1990).
238. See Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984).
Similarly, subjecting plans or insurers to misrepresentation claims does
not require the plan to maintain an ongoing administrative scheme, the
type with which the Supreme Court was concerned in Fort Halifax Pack-
ing Co. v. Coyne.'m The only administrative and economic result of per-
mitting such claims is that a court may force the plan to make a one-
time, lump-sum payment of damages.' There is no requirement of on-
going supervision, nor is there an ongoing obligation of payment. Here,
the goal of the action becomes important. Administratively and economi-
cally, a provider misrepresentation claim is much more like a standard
tort or contract claim brought by an outsider against the plan than like a
participant's claim for benefits.
The administrative and economic factors support the conclusion that
ERISA should preempt provider misrepresentation claims. But these
factors alone might not justify that conclusion absent the two remaining
factors: whether the suit affects the relations among principal ERISA
entities and whether alternative remedies exist for providers. Courts have
consistently been much more reluctant to preempt state laws when they
do not affect the relations among principal entities such as the employer,
the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the beneficiaries." The reason is that
the connection with an ERISA plan and its principal concerns is clearly
less when the plan deals with the outside world in a standard business
context than when it deals with its beneficiaries on internal plan matters.
This principle helps explain why the Supreme Court has found that
ERISA plans can be sued for traditional run-of-the-mill state law
claims.'
The argument against preemption of provider claims is even more
compelling given that the effect of preempting a provider's claim leaves a
non-ERISA entity without a remedy. The Sixth Circuit may well be cor-
rect in its assertion that the lack of an alternative remedy usually does
not matter for purposes of an ERISA participant's claims.' However,
239. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
240. Note that this is not always the case. There may be no economic effect at all
when the employer is sued as a corporation. See National Expert Care Consultants,
Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 5390 (JFK), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2050,
2054 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1991); see also Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon, Betrayal
With Remedy-Can Medical Service Providers Recover When The Administrator
Falsely States That Medical Services Are Covered?, 6 ERISA LrrG. REP. 14, 16 (1992)
(addressing the decisions in Hospice and Cromwell and concluding that a key factor
In determining whether ERISA should preempt provider misrepresentation claims is
whether the plan or the plan administrator in its individual capacity will pay a judg-
ment).
241. See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
242. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988).
243. Cromwell v. Equcor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2 (1992).
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there is obvious discomfort among courts with this result. In Degan v.
Ford Motor Co.,' the Fifth Circuit described its result of preempting a
participant's misrepresentation claim and leaving it without a remedy as
its "Unhappy Denouement.' The discomfort even affects commenta-
tors who defend ERISA plans and would be expected to applaud a broad
preemption doctrine.'
One can explain the lack of a remedy for participants, however, based
upon what some have called- the ERISA "bargain." "' As a part of that
bargain, plan participants gave up certain remedies and causes of action,
such as those for bad faith and punitive damages. This was in return for
a comprehensive federal scheme, including enforcement provisions, that
would eliminate inefficiencies, provide reporting, disclosure, and fiducia-
ry requirements, and facilitate the full and consistent payment of bene-
fits.' It can be said that although beneficiaries may be left without a
remedy in rare circumstances, they enjoy the overall benefits of ERISA
and the bargain they entered.
However, as Memorial Hospital correctly points out, third party medi-
cal care providers were not a part of this bargain.'s They receive none
of ERISA's protections or rights which would justify a finding that they
should give up certain standard state law remedies. A provider is an
ERISA outsider who encounters an ERISA plan in a business context and
a loss occurs. In this context, the question of preemption involves an
allocation of the risk of that loss. The performance of that allocation is a
classic state law function that involves few of the concerns of ERISA or
244. 869 F.12d 889 (5th Cir. 1989).
245. Id. at 895.
246. See Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon, "Betrayal Without Remedy". Part IV,
1 ERISA LrnG. REP. 14 (1991). The authors argue that the lack of a remedy in cer-
tain cases "appears so indefensible as a policy matter that judicial failure to provide
a solution will almost certainly result in Congressional intervention." Id. at 14. They
propose that courts in participant misrepresentation cases find that a promise to
provide benefits that a plan does not provide results in the "creation of a separate,
unfunded ERISA plan to pay the promised benefits." Id. at 15. While this might
resolve participation misrepresentation issues, it would not help health care providers
who lack standing under ERISA and who are subject to anti-assignment clauses
which prevent derivative standing.
247. Williams v. Caterpillar, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 148, 152 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 944
F.2d 653 (1991); Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 249
(5th Cir. 1990).
248. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v, Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1987).
249. Memorial Hosp., 904 F.2d at 249-50. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying
text.
matters that relate to an ERISA plan. There is no reason to believe that
Congress, in enacting ERISA, intended to deprive wronged outsiders of
remedies and to shield ERISA plans from the consequences of their
wrongful actions against such outsiders.
V. CONCLUSION
Health care providers seeking to recover for misrepresentations of
coverage made to them by ERISA plan representatives face a great deal
of uncertainty. Federal courts have reached every possible result on
whether ERISA preempts such claims.
The proper result is that ERISA should not preempt provider misrepre-
sentation claims. Such claims have an insignificant economic and admin-
istrative impact on ERISA plans. More importantly, they are brought by
ERISA outsiders as a result of a loss incurred in the course of their tradi-
tional business dealings. The claims have too tenuous a relationship to
an ERISA plan to warrant preemption.
